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In this contribution,
1
 I bring a postcolonial lens to questions of methodology – specifically, in historical 
sociology – and related normative claims of progress that I argue are central to the constitution of our 
discipline. I do so, not simply to discuss these issues in their own terms, but to think about whether 
the limitations inherent to them have a negative impact on our ability to address the contentious poli-
tics that disfigure our contemporary landscapes – here in Europe, and globally. I will suggest that the 
problematic features I address are longstanding and that many apparently new initiatives – such as 
multiple modernities – often end up replicating them. This is, in part, as a consequence of their failure 
to take seriously aspects of critique presented by postcolonial and decolonial theorists. What I wish to 
highlight here, as I have tried to do in my work more generally, is what difference would be made to 
sociology if we took seriously pertinent arguments from the fields of postcolonial and decolonial cri-
tique (Bhambra 2007, 2014).  
As such, I hope to persuade you of the centrality of colonial endeavours to our current social and 
political configurations and suggest that it is only by engaging with this past more directly that we can 
address the many challenges we face. In doing so, I shall also suggest that the sky will not fall in as a 
consequence of learning from others. The much vaunted need to protect critique from relativism, will 
in fact, be secured not undermined. Indeed, it is the failure to learn from postcolonial and decolonial 
critique that brings standard approaches to a problematic relativism. Let me begin with sociology’s 
comprehensive elision of colonialism and empire as integral to modernity’s development. While, in 
previous work, I have addressed these elisions in terms of the formation of the very concept of mo-
dernity, in this contribution, I’ll illustrate this elision substantively in the treatment of the modern state.  
Sociology and the Modern State 
As I have argued at greater length elsewhere, the modern state is one of the key concepts of the social 
sciences and has been central to comparative historical sociology from at least the work of Weber 
onwards (see Bhambra 2016). Weber’s definition of the modern state, as that entity which secures the 
legitimate exercise of coercive power within a given territory, is central to most sociological analyses of 
state formation. Since Weber, from the early collaborative projects associated with comparative poli-
tics and modernization theory to later iterations of cultural historical sociology, the focus has primarily 
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been on the emergence, in Europe, of what are seen to be sovereign, territorial states organized along 
national lines. Yet, the majority of these nation-states were actually imperial states with more expan-
sive boundaries and polities which impinged upon the formation of their ‘domestic’ institutions.  
In all cases used for illustration, the modern national state in Europe was, in fact, a colonial and im-
perial state. That is, it did not simply lay claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a 
given (national) territory, but extended that violence into other territories, over other populations, and 
in support of non-state actors such as trading companies and the activities of settlers. There was no 
claim for legitimacy from the subordinated population and, indeed, no such claim could be made in 
the context of colonial dispossession. But colonialism constituted part of the claim for legitimacy on 
behalf of its national population.  
First, however, to extend the discussion of the modern state – from nations to empires. As I have 
suggested, the European project of modernity is usually associated with the development of nation-
states (of citizenship bound to territoriality as Weber put it), but, as I will argue, it is better understood 
as founded through colonial endeavours, that is of empires rather than nations. In the case of Europe, 
processes of state formation are discussed in the context of internal developments from the 1600s 
onwards, while the incontrovertible fact is that the majority of these states – and their populations – 
were also involved in processes of colonization beyond their national boundaries. This is easily under-
stood in the cases of Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, and even Germany, but it was also the case in 
terms of Scandinavian and Eastern European countries as a form of what nineteenth-century German 
advocates called “emigrationist colonialism” (Smith 1980).  
Yet, there is rarely any consideration of how colonial relations of domination and subordination 
connected dispersed territories and populations within an imperial polity, nor of how a specific nation-
state form of that polity only emerged as a consequence of decolonization. It did not exist prior to 
then. European nation-states are, for the most part, postcolonial states, yet European commentators 
refer only to decolonized states as postcolonial. In what follows, I take the example of the emergence 
of the German state to demonstrate the foundational nature of such elisions, however, it should be 
clear that the violence that is entailed is common to all European empires. 
From Nations to Empires  
The establishment of the German state in 1871, under the leadership of Bismarck and Prussia, was 
followed by the intensification of processes of ‘de-Polonization’ and ‘Germanification’ at the border-
lands of the new state. The formerly Polish areas that had been annexed by Prussia and then settled 
by German colonists in the eighteenth century, Zimmerman argues (2006, p. 59), suffered further 
waves of “internal colonization” into the twentieth century. After German unification, these settle-
ments were increasingly conceived of in explicitly anti-Polish terms (and, of course, anti-Semitic ones). 
The political project of the German state, then, was built through its conceptualization as a nation, that 
is, as an ethnically German state. Indeed, in his inaugural lecture in Freiburg in 1895, Weber outlined 
an economic policy that would prevent the displacement of German peasants by Polish labourers and 
thus would strengthen the power of the newly established German state. “Our state is a national state,” 
he asserted, “and it is this circumstance which makes us feel we have a right to make this demand” 
(1980 [1895], p. 436). Note how the claim for legitimacy is undertaken in terms of the incorporation of 
territory beyond that associated with the German ethnie while at the same time asserting that ethnic 
identification over Poles (and Jews). 
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While Weber elides the concept of the nation with imperial power, what enables the concept to 
gain traction in its own terms is the omission of German imperialism from what is presented as a ‘na-
tional’ history. Within thirteen years of unification, the German state had begun the process of acquir-
ing, what Sebastian Conrad has called, “the fourth largest colonial empire at the time” (2013, p. 544). 
The 1885 Berlin Conference not only formalized the idea of the ‘internal’ colonization – or ‘Germanifi-
cation’ – of the eastern provinces, but, according to Conrad (2013), also began the formal process of 
European, including German, colonization of Africa. At the same time as establishing itself in Europe, 
the incipient German state consolidated its hold over external territories through a variety of violent 
colonial expeditions, including in South-West Africa (where the Herero and Nama people were effec-
tively exterminated). 
Weber is critical of the inability of the contemporary political leadership to understand the im-
portance of overseas expansion to Germany’s national (economic) interests. If unification of the na-
tion, rather than becoming a world power, was the end point of the political development of the state, 
then, Weber suggests, it should “have been avoided on grounds of excessive cost” (1980 [1895], 
p. 446). The implication is for Germany not to be ‘left behind’ in the European game for domination 
and to become a colonial or imperial power in its own right. In this way, we see that Weber’s economic 
nationalism was to be executed through imperial political ambitions and, more precisely, expansion. 
The ‘national interest’ is not the construction of a ‘national state’, but an imperial one. As an aside, we 
see the shadow of this historically also in other empires, including the British Empire and also in Brit-
ain in our present moment where the economic nationalism underpinning Brexit is to be achieved 
through establishing what the Secretary of State for Trade initially called ‘Empire 2.0’. 
This focus on expansion and concomitant domination, however, is never explicitly theorized in the 
development of Weber’s understanding of the sociology of the state, or in other sociologies of the 
state which quickly shift to capitalism rather than colonialism as modernity’s real vehicle. The German 
colonial empire may have only lasted 30 years, from 1884 to 1915, but I would suggest that ‘imperial-
ism’ was a constitutive aspect of the project of nation-state formation as identified by Weber himself. 
Nations, he argued, were not defined merely in terms of ethnic or cultural homogeneity, but through 
the welding into a group of a people defined by their shared political destinies and struggles for pow-
er. These struggles were not only against minorities ‘at home’ but also struggles to become a world 
power through overseas expansion. The failure to address the history of the German state directly and 
to theorize imperialism explicitly as an aspect of what is otherwise presented as the nation-state has 
formatively shaped contemporary comparative historical sociology and is responsible, I suggest, for 
many of its limitations.  
The Colonial Modern 
The ‘colonial modern’ better describes a situation where territoriality is organized around domination 
and the preferential inclusion of ‘domestic’ populations within a racialized political community that 
extends across borders. The elision of the imperial state to the national state matters because of its 
consequences for how we understand the normative definition of the state and the related concepts 
of legitimacy and domination with which it is strongly associated, and which are an integral part of our 
current discussions of belonging and rights. To the extent that state building and political formation 
are seen as aspects of societal self-construction, then questions regarding modes of legitimacy within 
modern states are strongly associated with the societies recognized by those states. Societies outside 
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of those associated with the state, upon whom the state acts in a mode of domination – such as those 
who are colonized – fall out of consideration when thinking about questions of legitimacy.  
The Weberian definition – common across the social sciences – evades consideration of the use of 
force by the state’s apparatuses outside of its self-understood, core territory and for the purposes of 
including wider territories within its borders against the wishes of those inhabitants for such incorpo-
ration. Indeed, ‘incorporation’ is often the euphemism used by historical sociologists in their scant 
considerations of violent conquest and genocide as factors in the emergence of European and ’new 
World’ polities. For example, when discussing the colonial heritage of Spanish America, Wolfgang 
Knöbl suggests that the differences in outcome rest in part on whether “the indigenous population 
was originally weak in numbers or quickly extinguished as a consequence of colonialism” (2014, 
p. 316). There is no comment on the euphemism of ‘quickly extinguished’ or how acknowledging such 
violence would change the ways in which we otherwise understand issues of ‘development’ and ‘pro-
gress’ and ‘legitimacy’.  
Rather than consider the systematic (and, usually, genocidal) violence necessary in the establish-
ment of settler societies, many historical sociologists simply gloss over such facts. They are presented 
as societies with a de novo history, seemingly constructed in the act of settlement which includes its 
own amnesia (that is, failure of self-interpretation) which is absorbed by the interpretive sociologist 
themself. An example is the celebratory and exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the founding of 
the United States which is often traced to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. The fact that the US is a 
‘new nation’ means that it is able to forge its own destiny free of the encumbrances of history and 
tradition that continue to inflect European political forms. As such, it is seen to embody a particular 
form of modernity; one that is purified from the residues of Europe’s feudal past. It is seen not only to 
demonstrate the promise of emancipation regarded as inherent to modernity, but also to be the first 
lived expression of this modern form of politics.  
While many scholars have been keen to take up this aspect of Tocqueville’s work, few have gone on 
to address his other significant claim. Namely that the land of the United States was occupied by three 
races and that his account of democracy is primarily about only one of them because the history of 
the other two is of their subjugation by the very institutions and practices that are otherwise being 
praised; institutions and practices that those other two races necessarily experience as tyranny. It is in 
this way that silencing operates most effectively when even otherwise canonical figures are silenced 
when they say something that does not fit the standard narratives (see Margree and Bhambra 2011). 
This calls into question the very modernity attributed to the United States (and other ‘new societies’) 
and requires us to reconsider the social scientific claims that are otherwise made on the basis of it 
being regarded as the first modern nation. This is particularly so in terms of how native peoples are 
treated within and by our discipline and its elision of dispossession and settlement as central to the 
very possibility of the emergence of the modern.  
Rethinking Modernity and Multiple Modernities 
As will be commonly recognized, sociology takes as its remit the study of ‘us’, understood as modern, 
as opposed to the study of a traditional ‘them’ assigned to anthropology. The differentiation of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ on the basis of separate, civilizational, histories justifies attempts at understanding these differ-
ences within their endogenous dynamics rather than locating those dynamics within the entangled 
histories that produced them. As I argued at length in my book, Rethinking Modernity, notions of rup-
ture and difference are foundational to our discipline but erroneously so (Bhambra 2007). The events 
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that are commonly cited as bringing into being the modern world – namely, the industrial and French 
revolutions – have been demonstrated to have broader connections. Further, there are also other 
events and processes that could be considered as world historical that have been ignored by our dis-
cipline to its detriment. Namely, the processes associated with colonialism and imperialism that 
demonstrate the very interconnectedness of the world.  
The focus on endogenous dynamics, however, obscures these connections and the relations be-
tween places and peoples. It also naturalizes, and reads back through history, a separation which is 
more a conceit of emerging sociological theory rather than an adequately supported historical claim. 
The consolidation of this conceit, of historically separate entities, and the institutional effacement of 
the connected histories of colonialism occurs, in large part, through the disciplinary organization of 
knowledge itself. It occurs through the presentation of modernity as the core conceptual category of 
sociology without recognizing the coloniality of its constitution. This error is compounded by the move 
to multiple modernities despite rigorous critiques by postcolonial and decolonial theorists.  
Theorists of multiple modernities associate all positive normative substance to the European idea 
of modernity where the multiple other possibilities of (mostly non-European) modernity are seen to be 
largely authoritarian in nature and, unlike the European idea, not universalizable. The latter is univer-
salizable but need not be (which is seen to be the error of earlier modernization theory). However, 
with multiple modernities, the authoritarian nature of ‘European modernity’ itself, deriving from its 
colonial origins, is once again displaced. In this way, theorists of multiple modernities sidestep the 
issue of historical interconnections in the context of the emergence of European modernity – those 
connections argued for by postcolonial and decolonial theorists – and only regard as significant those 
connections that brought European modernity to other societies. Of course, they do not address the 
actual historical processes of colonialism, enslavement, and dispossession; rather these are euphe-
mized under terms such as European contact or mere diffusion.  
Critiques by theorists of decolonization and postcolonialism are dismissed as having no real pur-
chase on contemporary issues in light of the new sociological reformulations. To the extent that any 
significance is attributed to them, it is in terms of acknowledging the limitations of previous sociologi-
cal understandings, but without allowing those critiques to contribute in any way to the substance of 
required reformulations. Multiple modernities enable sociology to be endogenously reformed without 
having to engage with critiques which are presented as ‘external’ and not arising in relation to en-
gagements in common. In arguing for the continued significance of postcolonial histories and critique, 
both in their own terms and in terms of how these histories continue to structure the present, I am 
not posing an alternative, or multiple, modernity outside a trajectory common to the West; rather, I 
am arguing for a reconstructed understanding of modernity, one that is inclusive of its colonial histories 
and is reflective of the consequences of taking the ‘colonial modern’ as the central concept of our discipline. 
A perspective that I have called “connected sociologies” (Bhambra 2014). 
I will conclude this contribution by looking at how these issues relate to the urgent social and politi-
cal challenges that currently face us.  
Illiberal Europe and European Values? 
The failure to address the histories of colonialism is also what makes it so difficult to account for con-
temporary illiberal practices within and beyond the continent. It is the colonial histories of Europe that 
have produced its multicultural present – a multiculturalism that over the last five years political lead-
ers from Cameron to Merkel to Sarkozy have declared to have failed. What does it mean to say that 
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multiculturalism has failed when it is colonialism that created multicultural Empires and multicultural 
European societies? What does it mean to say that multiculturalism has failed when postcolonial Eu-
ropean societies continue to be empirically multicultural? What sort of politics does it legitimate? Per-
haps the sort of politics that requires many of us, to yet again, have to assert our humanity, the value 
of our being, beyond racialized hierarchies and structures. 
How could a postcolonial sociology better help us to understand this present? How could the ar-
guments I have made thus far about needing to recognize the colonial constitution of modern nation-
states shed some light on what is going on? 
The boundaries of the political community, and the associated rights of citizenship and the right to 
have rights, are usually imagined to be congruent with the territorial boundaries of the state as under-
stood in national terms. This idea of the political community as a national political order has been cen-
tral to European self-understanding and to standard social scientific accounts. Yet, as I have set out 
above, most European states were imperial states and even those that did not explicitly have empires 
were involved through the migration of their populations in the emigrationist European colonial pro-
ject. Across the nineteenth century, fifty or so million Europeans left their countries of origin to make 
new lives and livelihoods for themselves on the lands inhabited by others (Zahra 2016) – not on “free 
soil” as Weber thought, but on the soil appropriated from others.  
If we were to take this context seriously, it would be quite straightforward to understand that the 
majority of people within Europe who don’t look like ‘us’ – or rather, who look like me, but not like 
most of you – come from countries that had previously been colonized by Europe. As such, they /we 
are not treading new paths in our movement here, just making our way back along those very paths 
that had brought Europeans into our places of habitation. However, to the extent that many white 
European scholars engage with the idea of the postcolonial they do so in a way that only recognizes 
this return movement as constituting the postcolonial. Not the earlier movements of Europeans that 
established the colonial as the condition now for the postcolonial. It is this scholarly failure that ampli-
fies the misrecognition that is more widespread across the media and public opinion that sees many 
Europeans not recognizing darker Europeans as also European. The increasing turn to the far-right 
across Europe is not a new phenomenon, but can be seen to be an intensified one. The intensification 
is due, in part at least, to the hysteria generated in response to the crisis for refugees. Yet what exactly 
constitutes this crisis?  
In the year in which Europe saw the most asylum applications – the worst year in the Syrian conflict 
that produced fatalities in the hundreds of thousands – in that year, the number of asylum applications 
constituted 0.25% of the population of Europe. If we add the numbers of asylum applications that 
have been granted since 2015 we see that the increase in the total estimated population of the Euro-
pean Union is around 0.31%. Could there be an empirical crisis of the magnitude claimed on the basis 
of such a marginal increase in the population of Europe? If so, then things are even worse for Europe 
than the most pessimistic naysayer has ever imagined (see Bhambra 2017).  
Colonial Europe and its sociologies failed to recognize the populations of its wider political constit-
uencies as equals. Following decolonization and the formal end of empires, European states have 
purified their histories as national histories and imagined their political communities as composed of 
‘kith and kin’. In this context, there is a refusal to share obligations to those who were previously dom-
inated within their broader imperial political communities. This is the politics of selective memory that 
is currently playing out in Europe. Failing to recognize these imperial histories as the basis for the na-
tional states that now exist is precisely what enables some to argue for the rights of Europeans – of 
citizens – over the rights of others. But those others have histories that entitle them to be here. Not to 
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recognize those histories and the associated rights is to play into the dangerous politics that is cur-
rently disfiguring our present.  
The claim that it is only Europeans who are entitled to rights is being made across the political 
spectrum. It’s easily recognizable on the far-right, but what do we have to say about initiatives when 
they come from the left? When they talk about the need to protect ‘our’ workers from the conse-
quences of immigration? When they suggest that we need to respond to the legitimate concerns of 
those who want to see the borders closed to refugees? Asserting the legitimacy of the national state 
against globalization is an inadequate response to a history in which the nation-state has been created 
through globalization – globalization, or as it was formerly known, colonialism. In a situation of the 
general advantages of Europe, such advantages no longer deserve to be called rights; rights that are 
not extended to others are privileges. And in this way, imperial inclusion based on hierarchical and 
racialized domination is reproduced as national – joint European – exclusion, reflecting earlier forms 
of domination and similarly racialized. 
It is interesting that it is at this moment, that Europe postulates the thought that rights are bound-
ed and that its values are not universal. This is a relativism of privilege underpinned by a sociology that 
fails to acknowledge its constitution in our shared colonial past. The question for us, as sociologists, as 
we seek to work within our discipline, and as citizens, as we navigate the politics of our time, is … 
whose side are we on? That is not a partisan question, even though the taking of sides is inevitable; 
this is a question about our adherence to a universal now properly understood.  
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